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COMMENTS 
CRIMINAL LAW-REEXAMINATION OF TESTS FOR CRIMINAL RE-
SPONSIBn.ITY-Criminal law in the Anglo-American system of juris-
prudence is. based upon the concept that persons should be held re-
sponsible for their acts. A strong corrollary to this idea is that certain 
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types of persons, namely the "insane," should not be held responsible 
for criminal conduct. Although this proposition seems beautifully 
simple, courts in England and the United States for over a hundred 
years have wrestled with the problem of what constitutes insanity, or, 
to phrase it more accurately, what type of mental condition should 
preclude responsibility for a criminal act. 
I. Past Approaches to the Problem 
Without attempting to trace the entire history of formulated tests 
of insanity, the law in England and the United States may be briefly 
summarized. There are four major tests used, although the wording 
may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The first, and by 
far the most significant, is popularly known as the right and wrong 
test. Formulated in the famous M'Naghten case, the question was 
stated to be whether: 
". . . the party accused was labouring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did 
not know he was doing what was wrong .... "1 
This is the law in England today and until recently the primary test of 
mental responsibility in all but one jurisdiction in the United States.2 
In fourteen or more states3 the so-called irresistible impulse test is used 
to supplement, but not replace, the M'Naughten rules. In substance, 
even though the defendant knew the act to be wrong, this rule excuses 
him if by reason of his mental condition he did not have enough will 
power to resist the impulse to commit it. A third rule worthy of brief 
mention is concerned primarily with persons suffering from insane de-
lusions. This test excuses a defendant if he would have had a valid 
defense, e.g., self defense, had the delusion he acted upon been true. 
This test also had its origin in the M'Naghten case and was at one time 
quite popular. Today, however, it is used in only seven or eight states;4 
the courts have been reluctant to impose a rational standard intended 
for sane and responsible persons upon persons suffering at least from 
delusions. The fourth test, although used only in New Hampshire, 
is significant because of the attention paid to it by legal writers and 
because it forms the basis for a new rule adopted in Washington, D.C., 
1 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200 at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
2 New Hampshire uses a different rule which will be discussed later. 
s See WmuoPEN, MENTAL D:rsoBDER AS A Cltn.nNAL DEPl!NSE 51 (1954). 
4Jd. at 104. 
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in the recent case of Durham v. United States.rs First formulated in 
1866,6 the New Hampshire rule was decisively adopted in 18707 and 
applied again in 1871.8 In the last of these cases the court rejected all 
conventional tests of insanity, saying that the entire question was one 
for the jury: 
". . . the real ultimate question to be determined seems to be, 
whether, at the time of the act, he had the mental capacity to 
entertain a criminal intent-whether, in point of fact, he did 
entertain such intent."9 
Under this approach, the jury must decide first whether the defendant 
had a mental disease and second, if he had, whether the disease was of 
such character or was so far developed as to take away capacity to form 
or entertain the criminal intent.10 
IL Durham v. United States 
With a very sketchy picture of the legal tests for determining crim-
inal responsibility as background, attention can be directed to the most 
recent attempt to formulate a satisfactory rule, the case of Durham v. 
United States. In this case the defendant, Monte Durham, was 
charged with housebreaking; his only defense was insanity. The evi-
dence showed that defendant had a long history of imprisonment and 
hospitalization: he had been committed several times to St. Elizabeths 
Hospital, where at one time the diagnosis was "psychosis with psycho-
pathic personality" and at another time it was "without mental dis-
order, psychopathic personality." Upon release, he was quick to break 
the law again. Under the housebreaking indictment, he was again 
found to be of unsound mind and spent another sixteen months in 
St. Elizabeths before he was released to stand trial. The trial judge 
correctly stated that the burden of proof as to the issue of sanity was 
on the government once the issue was raised, but stated that there was 
no evidence as to the defendant's mental state on the particular date 
of the crime, and therefore that the usual inference of sanity must 
stand. He further stated that the defendant had not shown himself 
to be of unsound mind in that he did not meet the right and wrong 
test or the irresistible impulse test. On appeal, the case was reversed for 
rs (D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862, hereafter referred to as the principal case. 
6 Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120 (1866) (dissenting opinion). 
1 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). 
s State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871). 
9 Id. at 382. -
10 WBIHOFEN, MENTAL TusoRDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 154 (1954). 
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error in the burden of proof question, a unanimous court holding 
through Judge Bazelon that there was sufficient evidence to shift the 
burden of proof to the prosecution and prospectively applying a new 
standard for determining criminal responsibility. 
The opinion purports to adopt a rule "not unlike that followed by 
the New Hampshire court." Because of its significance it may be well 
to set out the new rule in full: 
"It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his 
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. 
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is consid-
ered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use 'defect' 
in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of 
either improving or deteriorating and which may be either con-
genital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical 
or mental disease."11 
After thus stating the new test, the court expressly rejected the right 
and wrong test and the irresistible impulse test, 12 which until then had 
both been in force in that jurisdiction.13 
Reflected in Judge Bazelon's opinion are the traditional objections 
which have been leveled at the existing insanity rules for a number of 
years. Among the most frequently voiced criticisms are, first, that the 
words used are themselves ambiguous and have never been defined 
adequately; that "right" and "wrong" are changing ethical concepts 
which have no place in the criminal law. More particularly, it is com-
monly charged that the whole basis of the M'Naghten rules is invalid 
under prevalent psychiatric opinion. The rules were formulated at a 
time when the human mind was thought to be composed of distinct 
parts, such as the reason or the intellect as opposed to the emotions and 
instincts. Today virtually all psychiatrists believe that the personality 
is integrated and cannot be isolated in this manner. The right and 
wrong test, moreover, covers only disorders of the cognitive or intellec-
tual phase of the mind. Although it would seem that this deficiency 
could be mended by a liberal application of the irresistible impulse test, 
this test was also rejected by the Durham court.14 
11 Principal case at 874-875. 
12 Id. at 874. The court did state (at 876), however, that juries might want to take 
the old criteria into account, but that henceforth they need not be bound by them exclu-
sively. 
13 United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. Sup. Ct. (1 Mackey) 498 (1882), adopted the 
right and wrong test; Smith v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 548, added 
the irresistible impulse test. · 
14 Principal case at 874, where the court stated that "it gives no recognition to mental 
illness characterized by brooding and reflection .••• " 
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At this stage it might be well to point out that the new test might 
also be subject to criticism. First, the wording may prove difficult to 
construe. "The product of" definitely signifies a causal connection, but 
in what degree the court does not say. Courts have always had to 
struggle with the problem of causation, however, and perhaps it is wiser 
not to become entangled in such qualifying words as "substantial," 
"principal" and so forth.15 In addition to this difficulty, critics of the 
new rule will doubtless take issue with the breadth of the definition 
of mental disease.16 As stated, it is wide enough to include many forms 
of mental disease from certain types of the so-called "psychopathic 
personality" to the psychoses. Courts and lawyers may fear that this 
will lead to a breakdown of the whole legal attitude toward crime if 
any number of minor mental deviations are allowed to come within 
the test. Although there may be some validity to this objection, it is 
also dangerous to restrict the definition to one type of disease, for in-
stance, to the psychoses. A "psychopath" might well be more danger-
ous to society, and undeterrable by a prison sentence or threat thereof, 
than would certain types of psychotics. Therefore, tentatively accepting 
the value of this breadth and simplicity in the rule, the fundamental 
premises of the test itself must now be examined. 
Before going into an analysis of the court's reasoning, it might be 
advisable to set out some of the suggestions made by other leading 
authorities in the criminal law :field. Some of the more cautious recom-
mend merely that the M'Naghten rules and the irresistible impulse test 
be expanded and given a more liberal interpretation.17 The noted pro-
fessor of criminal law, Herbert Wechsler, suggests that the question 
should be whether the capacity of the defendant to control his conduct 
is so greatly impaired that "he cannot justly be held criminally respon-
sible."18 Apparently the authorities in the :field of psychiatry would 
recommend a test which would include two questions: whether the in-
dividual was suffering from a medically recognized mental disorder 
and, if so, whether it had significantly distorted his social judgment or 
15 See Wechsler, ''The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility,'' 22 UNIV. Cm. L. R.mr. 
367 at 371 (1955), where he reasons: ''It will no doubt be answered that the problem for 
the jury is to give importance to causal relationships that satisfy its sense of justice in 
relation to a criminal conviction." 
16This criticism has already been made. See 68 HARv. L. Ri!v. 364 (1954); also 
Wechsler, "The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility," 22 UNIV. Cm. L. Ri!v. 367 (1955). 
17 See Hall & Menninger, "'Psychiatry and the Law'-A Dual Review," 38 IowA 
L. Ri!v. 687 (1953), where Hall so recommends at 695. See also GLUECK, MENTAL D1s-
ORDER AND THE CruMINAL LAw 472 et seq. (1925). 
1s Wechsler, ''The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility," 22 Umv. Cm. L. Ri!v. 367 
at 372 (1955). 
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seriously impaired his social control.19 Perhaps the most significant re-
cent work on the problem of insanity rules is the 1953 Report of the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in England. This Commis-
sion concluded that the M'Naghten rules, standing alone, were not 
adequate, and that a liberal form of the irresistible impulse test should 
be added, the new impulse test merely to ask whether the defendant 
"was incapable of preventing himself from committing it."20 This sug-
gestion, however, was not the whole of the Commission's recommenda-
tion. It was believed preferable to abrogate the rules entirely and "to 
leave the jury to determine whether at the time of the act the accused 
was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a 
degree that he ought not to be held responsible."21 Finally, one of the 
more extreme views taken would base the test on "the presence or 
· absence of a clinically recognizable mental disorder (psychosis) or 
mental deficiency (imbecility or idiocy) at the time the crime was com-
·tt d "22 rm e. 
Although the purpose of the run-down of suggested tests may not 
have seemed clear, upon examination it will be seen that these and 
the existing tests (including that of New Hampshire) all have several 
elements in common. First, they all require proof of a mental disease 
or deficiency. It would also be reasonable to say that underlying all 
of these tests is the assumption that there is a causal connection be-
tween the disease or deficiency and the crime charged. This is evi-
denced by the fact that in each case the insanity must be with respect to 
the crime charged rather than in the abstract. The third, and perhaps 
the most vital, common characteristic deals with the question of moral 
responsibility, the crux of the entire insanity problem. The concept 
of moral responsibility is often referred to, but seldom d~fined. Culpa-
bility and blameworthiness seem to be its closest synonyms. It takes 
the form of a collective moral judgment which is deemed a prerequisite 
to a penal conviction. The inadequacy of any explanation is apparent, 
but the principle remains: before any man can be sent to jail, there 
must be a moral judgment imposed upon him. In other fields of the 
criminal law, this might be called the mens rea; writers in the field of 
19 According to Gtn.TMAcHER AND WEIHoPEN, PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 420-421 
(1952). 
2DRoYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1953 Report, p. 111. 
21 Id. at p. 116. 
. 22Ploscowe, "Suggested Changes in the New York Laws and Procedures Relating to 
the Criminally Insane and Mentally Defective Offenders," 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY 
AND PoucE SCIENCE 312 at 314 (1952). Note that although this seems broader than the 
Durham rule, the parenthetical definitions of disorder and deficiency restrict its application 
substantially and even arbitrarily. 
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insanity seem to prefer to call it moral responsibility. The M'Naghten 
rules try to reach this concept by asking, did the defendant know what 
he was doing or that it was wrong? the irresistible impulse test by say-
ing, could he help himself? the New Hampshire test by demanding 
that he have the requisite criminal intent. The Royal Commission and 
Professor Wechsler state the problem the most succinctly: ought he be 
held responsible? Assuming that these three requirements are neces-
sary, then it would follow that the existence of a mental disease will 
not invariably excuse a person from criminal responsibility even if the 
causal factor is established. He must further establish that his mental 
disease took such a form that it impaired his social judgment or control, 
that it rendered him morally irresponsible. One theory behind this 
requirement seems to be that if he has in fact retained judgment and 
control, he is deterrable by punishment or threat of punishment. 
Whether or not this is one hundred percent accurate medically, it 
seems at least eminently reasonable. Broadly construed, the M'Naghten 
rules together with the irresistible impulse test try to accomplish these 
ends. It is generally conceded, however, that if strictly applied they 
often work injustice. Their fallacy lies in their attempt to define the 
symptoms of moral irresponsibility. The presence or absence of 
these symptoms is usually indicative of responsibility, but not invariably 
so. 
Under the Durham test, whether the act was the product of mental 
disease or mental deficiency, it can readily be seen that only two of the 
three traditional elements of criminal responsibility are present. The 
element of blameworthiness is omitted from the wording of the test 
itself. This is not to say that it was forgotten by the able court or its 
importance overlooked. On the last page of the opinion the court 
declared that "in leaving the determination of the ultimate question 
of fact to the jury, we permit it to perform its traditional function which 
. . . is to apply 'our inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals 
prosecuted for crime' .... "23 It is evident from this statement that 
the court intended that the new test be used only in connection with 
this concept of moral responsibility. The test itself and the charge to 
the jury suggested by the court are silent in this respect, however. This 
would appear to be a real danger to the ultimate success of the rule. 
For if a jury hears only the test without the later qualification of moral 
responsibility, it will inevitably conclude that mental disease plus causa-
tion should automatically mean acquittal. Academically, it may be 
23 Principal case at 876, quoting Holloway v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 148 
F. (2d) 665 at 667. 
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proper to exonerate anyone who can establish the existence of a mental 
disease in relation to an otherwise criminal act, but pragmatically, those 
who administer American justice are not quite ready to adopt that 
view. Perhaps in the future psychiatry and the law will have become 
sufficiently allied so that the law will accept the premise that every 
mental disease warrants such recognition, but for the present at least the 
law should not deprive the jury of its function of making this moral 
judgment. 
III. Significance of Mental Disease in Other Phases 
of Criminal Law 
At first blush it seems brutal that a person with a mental disease 
or defect which caused his acts will be held to account if he does not 
meet the requirement of moral responsibility. This does not mean 
that his mental disorder cannot play an important part in deciding his 
fate, however. There are at least four ways in which an accused may 
avail himself of his mental disorder.24 First, it may be grounds for 
reducing his punishment.25 At least ten states accept the fact that 
mental disorder may serve to negate the specific intent required for the 
crime charged.26 For instance, if it was of sufficient gravity to take 
away the capacity to premeditate and deliberate, a person charged with 
murder in the first degree would be able to reduce the charge to second 
degree. The states which follow this principle represent a growing 
minority, the only major objection being that the line between the 
various degrees of crime is at best difficult to draw. The principle, 
however, is one which has been accepted since the earliest days of the 
common law, namely, that an act must be accompanied by the necessary 
criminal intent before it is a crime. A second manner in which mental 
disorder is recognized is by specific legislation dealing with certain 
types of offenders who are most likely to be mentally abnormal. An 
example of this type of legislation may be found in the sexual psycho-
path laws which have been enacted in at least twenty states.27 These 
generally provide for commitment proceedings or psychiatric examina-
tion for sex offenders either upon indictment or conviction or before 
trial. Another example of this type of statute may be seen in the 
24 Weihofen, "The M'Naghten Rule in Its Present-Day Setting," 17 FED. PRoBAnoN 
8 (1953). 
25 Weihofen and Overholser, "Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime," 56 
YALE L.J. 959 (1947). 
26WmnoPEN, MENTAL DisoRDER AS A CmMINAL DEFENSE 184 (1954). 
27 Jd. at 196. 
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Massachusetts Briggs Law28 which provides for routine psychiatric 
examination before trial of every person charged with certain major 
felonies or for certain types of habitual offenders. Third, due process 
requires that every person be mentally competent to stand trial. A 
person who might fear a harsh application of the right and wrong test 
or whose condition has deteriorated since the time of the act may 
raise this point and thus be sent to a mental hospital for treatment. 
The usual test in this area is whether the accused is mentally competent 
to understand the nature of the proceedings and to aid in his own 
defense.29 Finally, the mental disorder of the defendant in many 
jurisdictions is considered in fucing his sentence. Many eminent 
authorities recommend that this sentencing function be greatly 
enlarged, virtually allowing an independent board of experts to settle 
the fate of an offender; some of them even suggest that the jury decide 
only the question of whether he committed the crime, leaving the rest 
to a commission of psychiatrists and social workers in conjunction with 
the judge.30 Each of these four roles of mental disorder represent 
significant developments in criminal law and can be only brieB.y stated 
in this study. They are pertinent to the problem of insanity tests pri-
marily in that they may aid persons who do not find relief under the 
existing rules, including the Durham test. 
IV. Conclusion 
This has not been an elaborate preparation for an endorsement 
of the status quo. Merely because mentally diseased or mentally 
deficient persons can £nd solace in other £elds of the law when a harsh 
application of the old rules precludes the insanity defense does not 
mean that nothing should be done to improve the existing tests where 
possible. For a number of years dissatisfaction with the right and 
wrong test and the irresistible impulse test has been expressed by 
medical and legal opinion alike. This has not resulted in constructive 
action primarily because many believed that a better rule had not been 
28 Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 123, §lO0A. It is also worthy of note that this law 
has largely eliminated the ''battle of the experts" in Massachusetts because the impartial 
experts who report on the mental health of the offender may, and do, testify at the trial. 
20 See WEmoFEN, lNs.ANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAw 335-340, 347-348 
(1933). 
30 See WEmoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CmMINAL DEFENSE 206-211 (1954); 
GLtlllCK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CmMINAL LAw 485-486 (1925); Stevenson, "In-
sanity as a Criminal Defense: the Psychiatric Viewpoint," 25 CAN. B. REv. 731 (1947); 
Waelder, ''Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility," 101 U:mv. PA. L. REv. 
378 (1952). See also CARDOzo, WHAT MEDICINE CAN Do FOR THE LAw 8 et seq. (1930), 
where it was foreseen that some clay this might be the practice in all cases. 
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suggested. The Durham opinion represents a possible solution to 
many of the difficulties inherent in the existing tests. The principle 
of the new test is valid as far as it goes. If the moral responsibility 
factor were included in the body of the rule, it would present a test 
which other jurisdictions might do well to follow. A more complete 
formulation of the test might encompass this factor to read substantially 
as follows: the question is whether his unlawful act was the product 
of mental disease or mental defect to such a degree that he ought not 
to be held responsible. 31 
Mary Lee Ryan 
31 Cf. RoYAL CoMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1953 Report, p. 116. 
